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Detection of Adversarial Training Examples in
Poisoning Attacks through Anomaly Detection
Andrea Paudice, Luis Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez, Andra´s Gyo¨rgy, and Emil C. Lupu
Abstract—Machine learning has become an important com-
ponent for many systems and applications including computer
vision, spam filtering, malware and network intrusion detection,
among others. Despite the capabilities of machine learning algo-
rithms to extract valuable information from data and produce
accurate predictions, it has been shown that these algorithms
are vulnerable to attacks. Data poisoning is one of the most
relevant security threats against machine learning systems, where
attackers can subvert the learning process by injecting mali-
cious samples in the training data. Recent work in adversarial
machine learning has shown that the so-called optimal attack
strategies can successfully poison linear classifiers, degrading the
performance of the system dramatically after compromising a
small fraction of the training dataset. In this paper we propose
a defence mechanism to mitigate the effect of these optimal
poisoning attacks based on outlier detection. We show empirically
that the adversarial examples generated by these attack strategies
are quite different from genuine points, as no detectability
constrains are considered to craft the attack. Hence, they can be
detected with an appropriate pre-filtering of the training dataset.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, poisoning at-
tacks, adversarial examples, data poisoning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the big data era an increasing number of services rely on
data-driven approaches that leverage the information available
from many sources, including devices, sensors and people.
Machine learning algorithms allow to extract valuable infor-
mation from this overwhelming amount of data and have been
successfully applied in many application domains. This trend
is set to continue as machine learning is increasingly adopted
to support important economical assets. Cyber-security ap-
plications are also increasingly relying on machine learning
systems, and machine learning is one of the main components
of state-of-the-art systems for detecting malware, spam, or
network intrusions [1]–[3]. However, machine learning sys-
tems are vulnerable themselves [4]–[10], and can be targeted
by attackers. In particular an attacker can exploit their vul-
nerabilities to avoid detection or to degrade the performance
of the system by injecting malicious data. Far from a mere
hypothesis, such attacks have already been reported in the
wild against autonomous bots,1 anti-virus engines,2 spam
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filters, as well as to create fake news3 or profiles in social
networks, among others. Among others, the emerging field
of adversarial machine learning aims at understanding the
security properties of machine learning by both analyzing
the mechanisms that can allow attackers to compromise the
algorithms and proposing defence techniques to mitigate them
[9].
We can broadly distinguish between two different kind of
attacks: evasion and poisoning attacks [7]. In the first case, the
attacker aims to produce an intentional error in the machine
learning system to perpetrate malicious activities or to cause
misclassification at run-time, i.e., when the system is already
deployed. For example, [11] shows how to evade Google’s
Perspective API4 to detect toxic comments by replacing words
that are likely to be identified as offensive with slightly altered
versions of those words. In a poisoning attack, the attacker is
assumed capable of partially modifying the training data used
by the learning algorithm, producing a bad model and causing
a degradation of the system’s performance, which may facili-
tate, among others, subsequent system evasion. For example,
in the context of spam filtering, attackers can craft spam emails
that contain words likely to appear in good emails. When
the spam filter is retrained on new examples including these
malicious emails, the learned filter will increase significantly
its false positive rate [12].
Poisoning attacks are considered one of the most significant
threats for systems that rely upon collecting data in the wild
[13]. For example, many services use the users’ feedback on
their decisions to update or refine the learning algorithm. An
attacker can thus provide malicious feedback crafted to poison
the system and compromise its performance. The integrity
of data collection and labelling are often not guaranteed in
many applications. For example, malware samples are often
collected from compromised machines with known vulnerabil-
ities - like honeypots - or from online services like VirusTotal,5
where labelling errors are frequent. Previous work [14]–[18]
has demonstrated that popular machine learning algorithms
can be successfully poisoned with well-crafted adversarial
examples. The proposed attack strategies have often focused
on a worst-case analysis, where the poisoning examples are
designed to maximise the damage on the learning algorithm
in a targeted or an indiscriminate way. However, these attack
strategies only consider the learning algorithm, and the re-
strictions about the poisoning points that can be generated are
3https://www.wired.com/2017/02/internet-made-fake-news-thing-made-
nothing/
4https://www.perspectiveapi.com/
5https://virustotal.com
2loose and arbitrary. Usually, the attack points are only required
to be within the feasible domain of the feature space.
Defence techniques against poisoning attacks have been less
explored in the research community. In [12], the proposed
defence strategy relies on measuring the impact of each
sample on the performance of the algorithm. Although it is
effective to detect some poisoning attacks, testing the impact
of each sample in the training dataset is often computationally
very intensive, as it requires to re-train and evaluate the
performance of the algorithm for every sample in the set.
Even if we consider only a subset of the samples for re-
training, this can be impractical for many machine learning
applications. In [19], the authors propose a defence strategy
that eliminates outliers by solving an optimization problem
that aims to identify suspicious samples. However, the algo-
rithm requires to estimate the percentage of data points that
are expected to be outliers (which should be provided as a
parameter), which is far from a trivial task. If the estimate
does not corresponds to the reality the performance of the
algorithm is significantly affected, especially if the system
is not under attack. Furthermore, outliers are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed which is usually not the
case of smart attack strategies, where the adversarial points are
generated together to maximize the power of the attack.
In this paper we propose a different approach to detect
adversarial examples in poisoning attacks by considering the
whole pipeline of typical machine learning systems. The so-
called “optimal” attacks proposed in [16]–[18] only con-
sider the learning algorithm, overlooking previous data pre-
processing steps (the attacks are called optimal since they
select poisoning examples to maximize the damage to the
learner). We show that the adversarial examples generated by
these methods can be effectively detected and filtered with
appropriate outlier detection techniques. The curse of dimen-
sionality [20] implies that it is hard to estimate the under-
lying probability distribution of the data in high-dimensional
spaces (especially if the number of data points is limited).
Thus, applying outlier detection under these settings is far
from a trivial task. Notwithstanding these limitations, our
experimental results show that it is possible to mitigate the
effect of the attacks with outlier detection, even in the cases
where the data is scarce compared to the number of features.
Our experimental evaluation also shows that although more
constrained attack strategies, such as label flipping attacks,
are less effective than “optimal” attacks, when considering
the learning algorithm in isolation, the adversarial examples
generated are much harder to detect. Thus, label flipping
attacks are more harmful when considering the whole machine
learning pipeline. This suggests the necessity of designing
more realistic attack strategies to provide more accurate worst-
case analysis by analyzing the entire machine learning system,
not just the learning algorithm, in line with the sophistication
that can be displayed by smart attackers.
The main contributions of the paper are the following:
• We propose an effective and computationally efficient
countermeasure for poisoning attacks against linear clas-
sifiers based on data pre-filtering with outlier detection.
This defence strategy is agnostic w.r.t. the actual learning
algorithm and provides a useful methodology to enforce
the security of practical machine learning systems against
poisoning attacks.
• An experimental evaluation on real datasets, showing
the effectiveness of our proposed defence methodology,
including examples where the number of features is
high compared to the number of training points. The
experimental results show that the effect of the “optimal”
poisoning strategies described in [16]–[18] is strongly
mitigated by our countermeasure.
• We show in our experiments that simpler constrained
attacks, such as label flipping, are much harder to de-
tect. We also provide an empirical comparison of the
effectiveness of “optimal” and label flipping attacks when
considering the machine learning in isolation and when
we apply our defence technique. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first systematic study of the benefits
of outlier detection to mitigate the effect of data poisoning
against machine learning algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2
we describe the related work. In Section 3 we introduce the
“optimal” poisoning attack strategy formulation in the context
of linear models for binary classification. In Section 4 we
describe our defence technique to detect adversarial training
examples via outlier detection. In Section 5 we show our
experimental results on synthetic and real datasets. Finally, in
Section 6 we conclude the paper and discuss further research
avenues.
II. RELATED WORK
Poisoning attacks have been mainly explored in the context
of binary classification. The first practical poisoning attacks
have been proposed in [12], [21] for applications in spam
filtering and anomaly detection. However, such attacks do
not easily generalize to different learning algorithms. More
systematic approaches have been proposed in [16]–[18], [22]
where optimal attack strategies are defined as a bi-level opti-
mization problem where the attacker aims at maximizing some
objective function whilst the defender learns the parameters
of the model by minimizing some cost function evaluated on
the (tainted) training dataset. In particular, [18] first described
this attack strategy proposing a formulation to compromise
support vector machines (SVMs). Following a similar ap-
proach, [16] showed the vulnerabilities of popular regular-
ized learning algorithms and regularization-based embedded
feature selection methods, such as ridge regression, Lasso,
and elastic net, against data poisoning. [17] have considered
a unified framework to poison convex learning algorithms
with Tikhonov regularizers. Finally, an alternative algorithm to
solve the bi-level optimization problem based on back-gradient
optimization is proposed in [22]. This algorithm computes
efficiently the gradients required to solve the corresponding bi-
level optimization problem through automatic differentiation.
Compared to previous approaches, this technique does not
require to replace the inner optimization problem with its first
order optimality condition, whose solutions are only available
for some learning algorithms in closed form. Then, back-
gradient optimization allows to perform poisoning attacks
3against a broader range of algorithms, including neural net-
works and deep learning systems, extending the formulation
of the optimal attack to multi-class classification problems.
Other poisoning attacks have been devised against different
supervised machine learning algorithms, such as collaborative
filtering, autoregressive models for time-series forecasting, or
linear regression [14], [15], [23], [24]. These approaches also
consider the presence of a hypothesis-testing-based detector
that can identify suspicious examples. Thus, the proposed
poisoning strategies model this scenario, constraining the
attack points to evade the anomaly detector. However, there
is no empirical evaluation to support the validity and the
performance of their approaches.
On the defender’s side, [12] propose to measure the impact
of each training example on the classifier’s performance to
detect poisoning points. Examples that affect negatively the
performance are then discarded. Although this technique has
been proven to be effective against some types of poisoning
attacks, it is computationally very expensive and it can suffer
from overfitting when the dataset is small compared to the
number of features. In the context of generative models, [19]
propose a two-step defence strategy for logistic regression
classifiers: First outlier detection is applied, and then, the
algorithm is trained solving an optimization problem based
on the sorted correlation between the classifier and the labels.
The main shortcoming is that the defender is assumed to know
in advance the fraction of poisoning examples, which is not
available in practical applications, and the performance of the
algorithm is sensitive to this value. Recently, in [25] influence
functions from robust statistics have been proposed both as
countermeasure to label flipping attacks and to generate poi-
soning examples. The idea is to identify the impact that each
training example has on the classifier loss without retraining
the model. In this way, it is possible to efficiently identify
more dangerous examples that need a careful investigation
from the user and to identify which data point to modify in
order to maximally compromise the classifier’s performance.
A different approach to the problem has been taken in [26]
where a data-dependent upper bound on the performance of the
learner under data poisoning is approximated with an online
algorithm. The authors assume that the learner performs some
data sanitization before training, and derive an optimal attack
as bi-product of their upper bound estimation procedure. Note
however that the provided upper bound is only on the expected
surrogate risk rather than on the classification performance and
may be quite loose.
We propose a new technique to detect adversarial training
examples in linear classifiers through outlier detection, regard-
less of the training algorithm. As shown in Section 5, our
approach is effective to mitigate the optimal attack strategies
proposed in [16]–[18]. In contrast to [12], our defence tech-
nique is computationally more efficient and can be applied
to large datasets. Furthermore, the algorithm does not require
to know the fraction of poisoning points in advance, as it is
the case in [19]. As we demonstrate in Section 5, it is also
efficient in cases where the number of training points is of
the same order as the number of features. However, more
constrained attack strategies, like label flipping, cannot be
effectively mitigated with our technique. We see our work as
a complement to [26], as we consider more effective outlier
detection strategies against attackers which blindly optimize
the learner’s error.
III. OPTIMAL POISONING ATTACKS
In a poisoning attack the adversary injects examples in
the learner’s training dataset to influence the behavior of
the learning algorithm according to some goal defined by
the attacker. Typically adversarial examples are designed to
maximize the error of the learning algorithm, although more
subtle objectives can also be considered. In line with most of
the existing literature in poisoning attacks, we only consider
here binary linear classification problems. Thus, in this section
we describe the general framework to design optimal attack
strategies as a bi-level optimization problem [16]–[18]. Then,
we show a particular case for Lasso-like classifiers, which
are widely used in many applications. Different levels of
knowledge for the attacker can be considered, although we
restrict our formulation to perfect knowledge attacks, where
the attacker knows everything about the target system: both
the learning algorithm (including the feature selection process)
and the training data. Although unrealistic for practical scenar-
ios, the assumption of perfect knowledge provides worst-case
evaluations of the robustness of machine learning systems.
This can help to produce a quantitative estimate of the risk
and of the maximum degradation of the system performance
under the presence of a smart attacker, e.g. for applications
that require assurance on the performance of the system.
Furthermore, the evaluation of these attack strategies under the
assumption of perfect knowledge can be applied as a testing
benchmark to design more robust machine learning systems.
A. Problem formulation
Formally, a binary classification task is defined by a tuple
(Z,D,H, l): Z = X ×Y is the sample space, where X
represents the domain and Y = {−1,+1} the labels; D is
a probability distribution over Z , H ⊆ {f : X → Y} is a set
of classifiers, and ℓ : H× Z → R+ is a loss function. Given
a training set Str
6 of n i.i.d. samples from D, the goal of a
learning algorithm is to output a classifier hS : X → Y such
that LD(h) = Ez∼D[ℓ(hS , z)] is small. Many popular learning
algorithms achieve this goal by minimizing some empirical
estimate OL of LD, evaluated on the training set. Note that
OL is typically the regularized empirical average of a surrogate
loss ℓ′ of ℓ. In a poisoning attack, the attacker’s goal is to
find a set of p poisoning points Sp = {zi}
p
i=1 = {xi, yi}
p
i=1
that maximizes some objective function OA when they are
added to the training set, so that the new training set becomes
Sˆtr = Str ∪ Sp, where Str represents the untainted training
set. Similarly to [16]–[18], if we assume that the classifier is
parametrized by w, we can formulate the attacker’s objective
as the following bi-level optimization problem:
S∗p ∈ argmax
Sp⊆Z
OA = OL(Sval,w
∗)
s.t. w∗ ∈ argmin
w
OL(Sˆtr,w)
(1)
6Str is a multi-set, so repeated instances are allowed.
4where the attacker’s objective OA is evaluated in a separate
validation set Sval. In previous studies [16]–[18], the labels of
the poisoning points, ypi , are assumed to be selected arbitrarily
by the attacker and then fixed throughout the optimization
process, where we only have to find the values Xp = {xi}
p
i=1
that maximize the objective OA.
Solving Problem (1) is, in general, NP-Hard [27] and,
even if the loss function used by the classifier is convex, the
optimization problem is non-convex. However, it is possible
to apply a gradient ascent strategy to get a (possibly) local
maximum of the optimization problem in (1). As in [16]–[18],
provided that the loss function OL and the learning algorithm
are continuously differentiable w.r.t. the parameters w and the
poisoning points Xp, we can replace the inner optimization
problem in (1) by the corresponding first order optimality
condition (i.e., the gradient of OL is zero):
S∗p ∈ argmax
Sp∈Z
OA(Sval,w
∗)
s.t.
∂OL
∂w∗
(Sˆtr ,w
∗) = 0
(2)
Then, for the gradient ascent strategy, we can compute the
following update rule:
X(t+1)p = ΠX
(
X(t)p + η
(t) ∂OA
∂Xp
)
(3)
where ΠX (x) is a projection operator to project x onto
the feasible domain X , to handle bounded feature values
This projection operator only ensures that the values of the
poisoning points are valid points, but it does not include any
further restriction to include detectability constraints. As we
show in our experimental evaluation in Section 5, the lack of
control on the values that the poisoning points can take results
in poisoning points that are outliers that can be detected and
pre-filtered.
The derivative of the attacker’s objective function OA w.r.t.
the poisoning points is usually not explicit: OA is evaluated
on a separate validation set Sval, independent of the poisoning
points. However, there is an implicit relation between OA and
Xp through the parameters learned by the classifier w
∗, i.e.
by changing the value of the poisoning points we also change
the value of w∗, and so, the value of OA. Thus, we can write
the corresponding derivative in (3) as:
∂OA
∂Xp
=
∂w∗
∂Xp
∂OA
∂w∗
(4)
As suggested in [17] we can apply the implicit function
theorem on the KKT conditions in the inner optimization
problem in (2), so that:
∂w∗
∂Xp
= −
(
∂2OL
∂w∂wT
)−1
∂2OL
∂Xp∂wT
(5)
The application of the implicit function theorem in (5) requires
the expression of the KKT conditions to be differentiable
w.r.t. both w and Xp. Moreover, it also requires the Hessian
∂2OL/(∂w∂w
T ) to be a full rank matrix. Although these
conditions may appear restrictive, this attack strategy can be
successfully applied to well-known linear classifiers such as
the perceptron, logistic regression, or linear SVM [16]–[18].
B. Linear regression for classification: poisoning lasso
Similarly to [16], in this section we describe the formulation
of the optimal poisoning attack strategy for an ℓ1 regularized
linear classifier. We use this classifier for our experimental
evaluation in Sect. 5. As shown in [22], we can expect a
similar degradation of the performance of different linear
classifiers against optimal poisoning attack. Then, the use of a
different classifier should not impact the validity of our results.
Assuming that the labels are Y = {−1, 1}, the hypothesis
predicted by the linear classifier for a sample x ∈ Rd is given
by h(x) = sign(w⊤x+ b), where w ∈ Rd and b ∈ R are the
parameters of the classifier, and d is the number of features.
The simplest way to learn the parameters of this classifier is
minimizing the Mean Squared Error (MSE) over the training
set. Thus, in our poisoning scenario the loss function for the
learning algorithm can be expressed as:
OL(Sˆtr, (w, b)) =
1
2ntr
ntr∑
i=1
(w⊤xi + b− yi)
2 + λ‖w‖1 (6)
where ntr is the number of training samples and λ ∈ R
+
is the regularization parameter. Because of the ℓ1 penalty
term added to the cost function, the learned classifier is also
known as lasso for classification [28]. Note that by setting
λ = 0 we recover the standard perceptron algorithm. Lasso-
like classifiers are very popular in practical applications where
the number of features is larger or comparable with the number
of training points. In these scenarios standard algorithms are
prone to overfitting, i.e., the performance at training time is
significantly better than the performance at test time. The ℓ1
regularization term helps to mitigate overfitting, reducing the
complexity of the learned classifier by zeroing some of the
components of w. Therefore, classifiers with lasso are also
referred as a particular type of embedded feature selection
algorithms.
Applying the gradient strategy previously described for
an entire set of poisoning points can be computationally
expensive. As in [16], we use a strategy where we compute
the gradient for one poisoning point at a time. Following
the optimization problem defined in (2), we can compute the
derivative of the attacker’s objective w.r.t. a single poisoning
point xp as:
∂OA
∂xp
=
1
nval
nval∑
j=1
(w⊤xj + b− yj)
(
xj
∂w
∂xp
+
∂w
∂b
)
(7)
where nval is the number of validation sets used by the at-
tacker. To solve (7) we need to compute the implicit derivatives
as in (5), so that:

∂w
∂xp
∂b
∂xp

 = − 1
n

 Σ µ
µ
⊤ 1


−1 
M
w
⊤

 (8)
where Σ =
∑ntr
i=1 xix
⊤
i , µ =
∑ntr
i=1 xi is the sample mean of
the training data and M = xpw
⊤+(x⊤p w+ b− 1)Id with Id
being the d× d identity matrix.
Algorithm 1 describes the whole procedure for the optimal
poisoning attack strategy against Lasso-like classifiers. Al-
though the algorithm is based on the attack strategy proposed
5in [16], we have modified some of the steps, as we describe
below. The algorithm starts initializing the q poisoning exam-
ples that the attacker wants to craft (line 3). For this, several
alternatives can be considered. Similarly to [16] we assume
that ypj , the labels of the poisoning points, are arbitrarily set
by the attacker. We train the classifier with the training set
Str. Then, we select samples with labels opposite to ypj so
that the loss for these samples is maximized when flipping
their labels to ypj . At each iteration, the algorithm updates
the points individually (lines 8-11). In contrast to [16], we
retrain the classifier every time we compute the derivative for
a poisoning point. This allows us to compute the gradient ac-
curately, whereas the strategy proposed in [16] only produces
an approximate gradient. Finally, we have also included a non-
constant learning rate η which is computed at each iteration
applying the Golden Section (GS) method described in [29].
This allows to reduce the number of iterations and to enhance
the stability of the gradient ascent algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Poisoning Lasso-Like Linear Classifiers
1: procedure POISONING(Str, Sval, ǫ, λ, q)
2: t← 0
3: S
(t)
p = {x
(t)
pj , ypj}
q
j=1 ← chooseInitialPoints(Str)
4: repeat
5: Sˆp = {xpj , ypj}
q
j=1 ← S
(t)
p
6: for j = 1, . . . , q do
7: (w, b)← learnLasso(Str ∪ Sˆp)
8: Compute ∆(xpj ) = ∂OA/∂xpj )
9: g = ΠX (xpj +∆(xpj ))− xpj
10: η ← GS(Str, Sval, Sˆp, g)
11: xpj ← xpj + η g
T
12: t← t+ 1
13: S
(t)
p = {x
(t)
pj , ypj}
q
j=1 ← Sˆp
14: until |OA(S
(t)
p )−OA(S
(t−1)
p )| < ǫ
15: return Sp
IV. DETECTION OF POISONING ATTACKS WITH OUTLIER
DETECTION
To maximally influence the learning algorithm with a lim-
ited number of poisoning points, the attacker aims to achieve
the maximum impact on the learner with each malicious point,
as described by the bilevel optimization problem in (1). In the
case of linear classifiers, the loss function for the poisoning
points can be made arbitrarily large by increasing |w⊤xpj |.
Thus, if no restrictions are imposed on the possible values for
the features of the poisoning points, it is expected that most of
the points generated by the optimal attack strategy described
in Sect. 3 are outliers.
To illustrate this point in Fig. 1 we depict a synthetic
problem with 2 features where we aim to poison a Lasso-like
classifier by injecting one malicious sample solving the bilevel
optimization problem in (1). In the example we have generated
a binary classification problem where the distribution of neg-
ative and positive classes are bi-variate Gaussian distributions
with covariance Σ = 0.6I and means µ± = ±(1.5, 0) respec-
tively. We have drawn 25 samples for training and 100, 000
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Fig. 1: Synthetic example: Poisoning a Lasso-like classifier.
The colour map represents the MSE on the validation dataset.
Dashed and solid black lines depict the decision boundary for
the poisoned and clean dataset, respectively. The trajectory
of the poisoning point during the gradient ascent strategy is
shown in green. The black square determines the attacker’s
box constraint defined by F = [−4, 4]× [−4, 4].
for validation from each of the two Gaussian distributions. For
the purpose of the example we have constrained the samples
to lie in the box defined by F = [−4, 4]× [−4, 4]. Thus, the
attacker uses the projector operator ΠX in (3) to constrain
and project the poisoning points onto the feasible domain
determined by F . The regularization parameter for the linear
classifier has been set to λ = 0.01. In Fig. 1 we can observe
that, by adding just one poisoning point to the training set,
the decision boundary changes significantly. The color map in
the background represents the cost on the validation dataset
as a function of the position of the poisoning point. We can
observe that the validation cost, which the attacker aims to
maximize, increases as the poisoning point moves away from
the genuine data distribution. Thus, the resulting poisoning
point lies on the boundaries of the box constraint F . It is also
clear that if we do not define constraints for the attacker, the
value of the features for the optimal poisoning point can be
unbounded. Nevertheless, even defining such constraint, in the
example in Fig. 1 we can observe that the optimal poisoning
point, labelled as green, is still quite different from the genuine
training points in the same (green) class. So although we can
significantly affect the behavior of the learning algorithm just
by adding a small fraction of poisoning points, if no reasonable
constraints are imposed for the attacker, the generated attack
points can be detected with appropriate pre-filtering, as we
will show next.
The poisoning strategies proposed in [16]–[18] do not
consider any special restriction on the attacker’s side to craft
the poisoning points. Therefore, the generated adversarial
examples only need to lie within a feasible domain, deter-
mined by the values that the different features can take, but
not considering the underlying data distribution. The defined
feasible space for the poisoning points does not consider
the detectability constraints that can be expected from a
sophisticated attacker. Outlier detection in high-dimensional
spaces, i.e. when the number of features is large, is far from
a trivial task, especially if the number of available samples is
6small compared to the number of features. In these settings, it
is difficult to estimate the underlying probability distribution
of the data. This is known as the curse of dimensionality [20].
However, although comparing distances in high-dimensional
spaces is also challenging, we found that distance-based out-
lier detection techniques produce reliable indicators to detect
adversarial training examples.
In many practical applications, machine learning systems
are re-trained from time to time to adapt to changes in the
distribution of the data as new samples are collected. Given
the huge amount of data collected by many applications,
the curation of the training data is not always possible and
poisoning attacks represent a severe threat. However, curation
of a small fraction of the data can be achievable. Under these
settings, we propose to use distance-based anomaly detection
to detect adversarial training examples using a small fraction
of trusted data points. In Fig. 2 we depict the flowchart of
the proposed defence against the poisoning attacks in [16]–
[18]. We first split a small fraction of trusted data D into
the different classes, i.e. D+ and D−. Then, we train one
distance-based outlier detector for each class using this curated
data. Given a dataset, most outlier detection algorithms provide
an outlierness score, q(x) for each x in the dataset. To
compute the threshold to detect outliers based on q(x) we
use the Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (ECDF),
Fˆ , of the training instances’ scores. Then, we identify the
α-percentile, i.e. the value t such that Fˆ−1(α) = t. The
α-percentile controls the fraction of genuine points that are
expected to be retained after applying the outlier detector.
Smaller values of α will reduce the number of genuine points
to be considered for training, which can affect the accuracy
of the classifier. However, a small α decreases the accuracy
to detect poisoning points. Once the thresholds, t− and t+,
are calculated for the positive and negative classes7 and a new
(untrusted) dataset D′ is collected for re-training the learning
algorithm, we remove all the samples x′ ∈ D′ : q(x′) > t
c(x);
where c(x) is the label of x. It is important to note that
this defence mechanism works if the data used to train the
outlier detector is trusted. If this assumption is violated, the
outlier detector can be poisoned as well. In those cases,
defending against adversarial examples is even harder since the
adversary can be free to significantly change the underlying
data distribution [30].
For outlier detection, we have compared a number of popu-
lar algorithms based on the distance between data points [31]–
[34] and a well-known distribution-estimation based method
[35]. The score functions of these methods and their com-
putational complexity are reported in Table I along with the
values of their parameters used in the experimental evaluation
in Sect. 5 (using the values recommended in the corresponding
papers). Given a dataset D with n data points {xi}
n
i=1 with
xi ∈ R
d, the outlier detector in [31] uses the euclidean
distance of a test sample x to the k-th nearest neighbour in D
(denoted as dk(x;D) in Table I) as outlierness score. Similarly,
[32] computes the euclidean distance of x to the k-th nearest
7Note that a similar scheme can also be applied for multi-class classification
problems.
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Fig. 2: Flowchart of the proposed defence algorithm. The
training stage outputs a pair of thresholds to use at test time
to identify outliers.
neighbour from a subset of s points Sx(D) sampled without
replacement from D. In contrast, in [33] the outlierness score
is given by the euclidean distance between the test point and
the nearest neighbour given a subset S(D) with s data points
sampled with replacement from D. The algorithms in [32],
[33] are computationally more efficient than [31], as they only
require to compute the distance w.r.t. a reduced number of data
points, making them more appropriate for large datasets. The
one-class SVM approach described in [34] aims to find the
maximum margin hyperplane that separates the training data
from the origin in the feature space determined by a specified
kernel (in our experimental evaluation we have not applied
any kernel). This maximum margin hyperplane corresponds
to a decision boundary that encloses most of the training data.
The outlierness score is computed as ρ−x⊤w, where ρ and w
are the solution of the quadratic optimization problem of the
corresponding soft-margin SVM formulation in [34]. Finally,
the method proposed in [35] is based on the estimation of the
local reachability density ρ(x). This quantity grows when x
and its neighbourhood are close to the other points of D. The
outlierness score is computed as the ratio between the average
density of Nk(x) and ρ(x). Then, if a point is far from their
neighbours, even if these neighbours are close to other points
in D, the outlierness score is large.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have performed an experimental evaluation to assess the
validity of our defence using outlier detection to mitigate the
optimal attack strategy, described in Section 3, against linear
classifiers. For this, we have selected two real datasets from the
UCI repository:8 Spambase and MNIST, which are common
benchmarks in spam filtering and computer vision, which are
typical application domains in the literature on adversarial
machine learning. In the experimental evaluation we have
also included label flipping attack strategies, which have also
been shown to be effective to compromise machine learning
classifiers, although they are usually less effective than the
optimal attack strategies [18]. We have tested our defence
8https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets.html
7Score Function Parameters Complexity Reference
qk(x) d
k(x;D) k = 5 O(nmd) [31]
qkSp(x) d
k(x;Sx(D)) k = 5, s = 20 O(mds) [32]
qSp(x) minx′∈S(D) d(x,x
′) s = 20 O(mds) [33]
qSVM (x) ρ− x
⊤
w C = CV O(md) [34]
qLOF (x) (|N
k(x)|−1
∑
x
′∈Nk(x) ρ(x
′))ρ(x)−1 k = 5 O(n2md) [35]
TABLE I: Summary of the considered outlier detection algorithms. The parameters are chosen accordingly to the authors
suggestions. In the case of qSVM (x), we choose the C based on leave-one-out cross validation. The complexity entry refers
to the time needed to compute the score for each point in the set D.
using the different outlier detection algorithms described in
Sect. 4, exploring their sensitivity w.r.t. the percentile of the
ECDF threshold.
A. Spambase Dataset
Spamabase is a dataset for spam filtering benchmarking
consisting of 4, 601 emails out of which 1, 813 are spam (the
positive class) and 2, 788 ham, i.e. good emails (the negative
class). Emails are represented by means of 57 features: 3 of
them representing word statistics and the remaining represent-
ing term frequencies of the most significant words. In our
experiments we have restricted the feature set considering only
the term frequencies (54 features). On this reduced feature set
the baseline accuracy, i.e., the one obtained in the absence of
attack, is not affected, but the poisoning strategy is easier to
apply. We have converted the frequencies into a bag-of-word
model (i.e. we have used binary features x′ such that x′i = 1
if xi > 0, otherwise x
′
i = 0) the so the resulting problem is
better separated. Moreover, we have removed all duplicated
examples. Our final dataset contains 2, 443 and 1, 657 good
and spam emails respectively. For the experiments we have
created 10 random splits of the data with 200 examples to train
the classifier, 200 examples to train the outlier detection, 400
examples for the attacker’s validation set and the remaining
data for testing. In the case of the random outlier detection
methods, qkSp and qSp, for each split we have averaged the
results over 10 repetitions. In this case, since the number of
features is relatively small compared to the training set size,
we do not regularize the linear classifier (i.e. we set λ = 0).
Finally, to compute the attack points, we treat the features as
continuous in order to compute the gradients in the bi-level
optimization problem. Then, we round them at the end of the
optimization procedure, similarly to [18], [22].
The results are reported in Table II.(a), showing the effect of
the poisoning attack as a function of the fraction of poisoning
points (e.g. 5% poisoning for a training set of 200 examples
corresponds to adding 10 malicious examples). We can observe
that when no defence is applied the classification error on the
test set increases from 0.112 to 0.195 with 20% of poisoning
points. On the other hand, it can be appreciated that, regardless
of the specific method, outlier detection is very effective at
mitigating the effect of the attack. Actually, the distribution-
based approach, qLOF , even improves the performance on the
clean dataset when we set the outlier detection threshold to the
99 percentile. The distance-based algorithms achieve similar
performance, but at a reduced computational cost. It is inter-
esting to observe that for both qkSp and qSp the performance
is insensitive to the specific threshold as confirmed by a paired
t-test analysis at a 0.99 confidence level. Thus, even if some
non-malicious samples are removed, the performance of the
classifier is not affected.
B. MNIST Dataset
MNIST is a dataset for handwritten digit recognition [36].
Although the complete dataset involves 10 different digits, as
in [18], we consider the subtask of distinguishing between
digits 7 and 1 which is a binary classification problem.
Each digit is represented as a feature vector representing a
28×28 gray-scaled image, where each one of the 784 features
represents the relative pixel intensity on a scale between
[0, 255]. We normalize each feature to be in the range [0, 1].
The experimental settings are similar to the case of Spambase,
but in this case we use 800 samples for training the classifier,
800 for training the outlier detector, 1, 000 for the attacker’s
validation set, and the remaining for testing. In this case we
select the regularization parameter λ by means of a 5-fold
cross validation procedure on the training data poisoned with
the initial value of the poisoning points (i.e. the warm start).
When λ is chosen with a data-dependent procedure, as cross
validation, its value is also affected by the addition of the
poisoning points. Ideally, the poisoning attack strategy should
consider this dependency, but none of the previous work in the
literature has modelled this aspect. Then, for our experimental
comparison with the optimal attack strategy in [16] we only
provide a value for λ regardless of the fraction of poisoning
points. We leave the investigation of the evolution of λ as a
function of the poisoning points for future research.
The experimental results on MNIST dataset are reported in
Table II.(b). In this case, due to the relatively small training
set, compared to the number of features, the poisoning attack
is even more effective. The error raises from 0.037 in the
clean dataset to 0.391 after adding 20% of poisoning points,
i.e. the error increases more than 10 times. In this case, the
standard deviation of the errors is quite large when no defence
is applied. This is possibly due to the sub-optimality of the
attack in [16] which assumes that λ is constant regardless of
the fraction of poisoning points. As in the previous case, the
results in Table II.(b) show the effectiveness of our defence
with outlier detection to mitigate the effect of the poisoning
attacks. For example in the case of 20% poisoning the best
8Method α-percentile % of Poisoning Points
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
No defence - 0.112± 0.010 0.16± 0.015 0.174± 0.019 0.185 ± 0.020 0.195 ± 0.019
qk
90 0.117± 0.013 0.117± 0.013 0.117± 0.013 0.117 ± 0.013 0.117 ± 0.013
95 0.114± 0.012 0.114± 0.012 0.114± 0.012 0.114 ± 0.012 0.114 ± 0.012
99 0.114± 0.012 0.114± 0.012 0.114± 0.012 0.114 ± 0.012 0.114 ± 0.012
qkSp 99 0.113± 0.010 0.113± 0.010 0.114± 0.012 0.117 ± 0.010 0.120 ± 0.012
qSp 99 0.113± 0.010 0.113± 0.010 0.114± 0.010 0.115 ± 0.009 0.116 ± 0.011
qSVM
90 0.113± 0.010 0.124± 0.010 0.126± 0.011 0.134± 0.0140 0.137 ± 0.015
95 0.115± 0.010 0.123± 0.011 0.125± 0.013 0.131± 0.0110 0.136 ± 0.015
99 0.114± 0.010 0.122± 0.010 0.126± 0.013 0.127± 0.0110 0.137 ± 0.015
qLOF
90 0.119± 0.007 0.119± 0.007 0.119± 0.007 0.119 ± 0.007 0.119 ± 0.007
95 0.115± 0.007 0.115± 0.007 0.115± 0.007 0.115 ± 0.007 0.115 ± 0.007
99 0.111± 0.009 0.111± 0.009 0.111± 0.009 0.111± 0.009 0.111± 0.009
(a) SpamBase
Method α-percentile % of Poisoning Points
0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
No defence - 0.037± 0.005 0.087± 0.034 0.210± 0.146 0.296 ± 0.164 0.391 ± 0.160
qk
90 0.044± 0.004 0.066± 0.017 0.074± 0.021 0.073 ± 0.017 0.079 ± 0.025
95 0.042± 0.004 0.061± 0.012 0.069± 0.017 0.069 ± 0.014 0.07± 0.012
99 0.039± 0.006 0.062± 0.013 0.070± 0.014 0.069 ± 0.013 0.070± 0.013
qkSp 99 0.038± 0.004 0.061± 0.012 0.076± 0.029 0.067 ± 0.011 0.071 ± 0.012
qSp 99 0.039± 0.005 0.062± 0.013 0.072± 0.019 0.068± 0.011 0.070 ± 0.014
qSVM
90 0.039± 0.004 0.062± 0.016 0.072± 0.002 0.073 ± 0.018 0.079 ± 0.002
95 0.039± 0.005 0.061± 0.016 0.073± 0.002 0.073 ± 0.019 0.079 ± 0.019
99 0.039± 0.005 0.061± 0.016 0.072± 0.002 0.07± 0.014 0.078 ± 0.019
qLOF
90 0.049± 0.007 0.088± 0.035 0.108± 0.037 0.146 ± 0.128 0.155 ± 0.123
95 0.044± 0.005 0.074± 0.002 0.086± 0.023 0.087 ± 0.002 0.100 ± 0.039
99 0.041± 0.006 0.066± 0.017 0.075± 0.016 0.073 ± 0.001 0.079 ± 0.022
(b) MNIST
TABLE II: Results on SpamBase and MNIST datasets. Averaged test classification error plus/minus the standard deviation as
a function of the poisoning points. The first row shows the effect of poisoning when no countermeasure is applied. For each
outlier detection method we show the results for three different α-percentiles: 90, 95 and 99. For qkSp, qSp the errors for the
different thresholds are not statistically different, as a result of a paired t-test. Then, we only report the results for the 99-th
percentile. In bold, the results of the best method in the dataset for a given poisoning level.
method, qSp, leads to a classification error of about 0.07,
whereas the error rate when no defence is applied is 0.391. It
is also interesting to note that qLOF , which performed best in
the previous experiment, now offers the worst performance
amongst the different outlier detection methods compared.
We think that this is due to the difficulty of doing density
estimation accurately in high-dimensional spaces.
C. Label Flipping
We have also evaluated the effect of label flipping strate-
gies. Compared to the optimal attack, label flipping is more
constrained, as the adversary can only change the label of the
samples. We have considered two variants of label flipping
attacks, namely Random (RLF) and Informed (ILF) Label
Flipping. In RLF, the attacker selects points at random from
the training dataset and flips their labels. In contrast, in ILF
the attacker selects the training examples showing the largest
squared error with respect to a classifier learned over the clean
training data when their label is flipped. This is similar to the
approach used in [18] to select the initial points for optimal
poisoning attacks. In our experiment we have only considered
qSp as outlier detection method with a threshold equal to
the 99-th percentile of the empirical CDF, as it showed good
performance to mitigate the optimal poisoning attack on both
datasets, as reported in Table II, and it seems quite insensitive
to the threshold. We have used the same 10 random splits gen-
erated for the previous experiment and, for each split, we have
performed 10 repetitions. In the case of RLF, for each split we
also perform 10 further repetitions in order to cope with the
randomness of the selection of the examples to flip. Thus, each
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Fig. 3: Evaluation of outlier detection and RLS defences against optimal poisoning attacks and label flipping attacks. Each plot
reports the average test classification error as a function of the percentage of poisoning points. The solid red line shows the
classification error when no defence is applied. Dashed-dotted green lines depict the classification error for our outlier detection
based countermeasure (OD in the legend) when using as threshold of 0.99. The dashed blue lines depict the classification error
of RLS. First Row: Spambase. Second Row: MNIST.
combination of parameters requires 1, 000 repetitions in total.
In this experiment, we have also compared our countermeasure
against the method of unbiased estimators proposed by [37].
We refer to this method as RLS. This method is specifically
tailored to mitigate label flipping attacks. It learns a classifier
by minimizing the empirical risk derived from the robust loss
ℓ˜(h, (x, y)) = ((1− ρ−y)ℓ(h, (x, y))− ρyℓ(h, (x,−y)))/(1−
ρ+1 − ρ−1). We have considered ℓ to be the squared loss
and we have used gradient descent to optimize the empirical
loss. We have selected a learning rate of 0.1 and 0.01 for
Spambase and MNIST respectively. This algorithm requires
to specify two noise levels, ρ+ and ρ−, for the positive
and the negative examples, which are typically unknown. As
suggested in [37] we have estimated these noise levels with
a 5-fold cross validation procedure exploring the values given
in the set {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2}. For RLF, we have selected
ρ = ρ+ = ρ−.
Figure 3 shows the average test classification error as a
function of the poisoning points for the optimal and label
flipping attacks. For the sake of clarity we have omitted the
error bars in the plots. Similar to our previous results, in
Figure 3.(a) and (d) we can observe that outlier detection is
effective to mitigate the optimal attack in both datasets. In the
case of ILF in Figure 3.(b) and (e) both outlier detection and
RLS are capable of mitigating the attack in MNIST dataset.
Actually, RLS is capable of outperforming the standard clas-
sifier when evaluated on the clean dataset. This can happen
because RLS removes samples that, even if they are genuine,
can be considered harmful for the classifier. However, the
effect of both defence mechanisms to mitigate the poisoning
attack in Spambase dataset is limited, although the degradation
of the performance as a function of the poisoning points is
more graceful for the outlier detection defence. We can also
observe that, as RLF is a less aggressive attack strategy and,
hence, the effect of the poisoning attack is reduced compared
to ILF and the optimal attack, the malicious points are more
difficult to detect for both outlier detection and RLS. Thus,
on average, the attack points are closer to the genuine points
of the same class. For example, in Spambase, with 20% of
poisoning points, the averaged test error after applying outlier
detection is 0.149, whereas when no defence is applied the
error is 0.180. In Figure 3.(c) and (f) we can also observe that
the RLS defence partially mitigates the effect of the attack
for MNIST, whereas in Spambase the average performance is
even worse than the poisoning attack itself. The experimental
results show that label flipping strategies produce attack points
that are less trivial, compared to the optimal attack strategies.
Thus, it is more difficult to detect them, although the effect
of the attack is less significant when no defence is applied.
This suggests that there exists a trade-off between effectiveness
and detectability of the attack that should be considered when
modeling poisoning attack strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Poisoning attacks are considered one of the most relevant
emerging threats against machine learning and data-driven
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technologies. Since many applications rely on untrusted data
collected in the wild, attackers can inject malicious data capa-
ble of degrading the performance of the system in a targeted or
indiscriminate way. Optimal attack strategies have been pro-
posed against popular machine learning classifiers [16]–[18],
[22]. Although they have been shown to be very effective, the
proposed algorithms do not include any explicit mechanism to
model detectability constraints. The attack points generated by
these strategies are far from the genuine points, and then, can
be easily removed with adequate pre-filtering of the data. In
this paper we have proposed an outlier-detection-based scheme
capable to detect the attack points against linear classifiers.
Although performing outlier detection is challenging in high-
dimensional datasets, we have shown empirically that these
techniques are capable of mitigating the effect of optimal
poisoning attack strategies. At the same time, our experimental
evaluation shows that less aggressive attacks, such as label
flipping, can be difficult to detect with these defence mecha-
nisms, since the attack points generated are, on average, closer
to the genuine data points. This suggests the importance of
modeling detectability constraints when designing poisoning
attack strategies, similar to other applications in cyber security,
where there is a natural trade-off between the damage of the
attack and its detectability. Future work includes exploration
and adoption of aggressive localization, unlabelled data and
margin optimization techniques, which have been successfully
applied in computational learning theory for similar problems.
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